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State and green crimes related to water pollution
and ecological disorganization: water pollution from
publicly owned treatment works (POTW) facilities
across US states
Michael J. Lynch1, Paul B. Stretesky2 and Michael A. Long2
ABSTRACT Green criminologists often refer to water pollution as an example of a green
crime, but have yet to produce much research on this subject. The current article addresses
the need for green criminological analyses of water pollution problems, and draws attention
to an overlooked issue: water pollution emissions from state owned public water treatment
facilities or POTWs. Legally, POTWs may emit certain quantities and kinds of pollutants to
waterways following treatment. This does not mean, however, that those emissions have no
adverse ecological or public health impacts, or that those emissions cannot also be employed
as examples of green crimes or green-state crimes. Indeed, from the perspective of envir-
onmental sociology and ecological Marxism, those emissions generate ecological dis-
organization. Moreover, POTW emissions contain numerous pollutants that generate
different forms of ecological disorganization. The current study uses POTW emissions data
drawn from the US EPA’s Discharge Monitoring Report system for 2014 to illustrate the
extent of pollution emitted by POTWs in and across US states as one dimension of ecological
disorganization. To contextualize the meaning of those data, we review US water pollution
regulations, review the health and ecological impacts of chemicals emitted by POTWs, and
situate those emissions within green criminological discussions of green crime and green-
state crimes.
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Green criminologists have long referred to water pollutionas a general example of a green crime (South, 1998).Despite those references, green criminologists have
devoted little attention to the study of water pollution and its
consequences (for example, Lynch and Stretesky, 2013;
McClanahan, 2014; Johnson et al., 2015), leaving this area of
research open for further analysis of the scope, consequences,
regulation and punishment of water pollution crimes. This small
literature leaves much to be explored such as: the scope of water
pollution problems in different contexts; the analysis of water
pollution violations and the enforcement of water pollution/
quality regulations; the consequences of water pollution on
ecosystem stability and waterway species; and studies exploring
the intersection of water pollution and environmental justice.
Other disciplines have paid signiﬁcantly more attention to
detailing the extent and control of water pollution problems. By
the early 1990s, agricultural engineers had already employed
geographic information system software to analyse the effects of
nonpoint sources of pollution on water quality (Tim et al., 1992).
Environmental scientists have used complex residual variable
models to estimate violations of water quality standards (Borsuk
et al., 2002). Agricultural economists have modelled factors that
affect the punishment of water pollution violators (Oljaca et al.,
1998) and water pollution permit compliance (Bandyopadhyay
and Horowitz, 2006). Given this literature outside of green
criminology, it is rather surprising that green criminologists have
not paid greater attention to exploring water pollution related
harms as examples of green crime and injustice. Here, we draw
attention to this issue by examining how water pollution from
state owned/contracted publicly owned treatment work (POTWs)
contributes to ecological disorganization, and the kinds of
ecosystem damage those emissions produce.
POTW water pollution has not been widely described even in
literatures outside of criminology. There are nearly 16,000
POTWs in the United States of America (USA), which serve
about 234 million people, or 75% of the US population. POTWs
are generally owned by the state/government, and are central
water processing locations that receive all kinds of waste-water
from a variety of users and public sewage systems. POTWs treat
those efﬂuents and, in theory, emit “cleaned” water back to
waterways. Despite treatment, emissions from POTWs include
numerous pollutants. While many of those pollutants are legally
allowable, they nevertheless pose ecological and human health
concerns, indicating that applicable regulations may not be
stringent enough to protect eco-system and public health, and
that those emissions contribute to ecological disorganization
(Lynch et al., 2013). In that context, we argue that POTW
emissions can also be examined as examples of green crime, and
more speciﬁcally as green-state crimes. Illustrating these points,
we examine POTW emissions across US states employing US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emission data extracted
from the discharge monitoring report (DMR) for 2014. To
contextualize those data and the analysis of water pollution, we
review relevant laws regulating POTW water pollution in the
USA, the health and ecological consequences associated with
POTW emissions, and conceptualize POTW emissions as green
and green-state crimes that promote ecological disorganization.
POTW emissions as green and green-state crimes
Criminological research on POTWs offers a unique opportunity
to examine how state behaviours and green crimes/harms
intersect, and how POTW emissions contribute to ecological
disorganization. As state-owned/contracted facilities, POTWs can
legally discharge pollutants from treated waste water streams that
have adverse ecological impacts without necessarily violating the
law. Green criminologists have posed numerous deﬁnitions of
green crime that expand beyond the scope of the law to identify
behaviours that cause ecological, nonhuman species or human
health harms as green crimes (for example, Lynch, 1990; Beirne
and South, 2007; White, 2009; Brisman and South, 2013).
Since POTW emissions can include legally allowable yet harmful
pollutants, it is necessary to look beyond the law to conceptualize
those emissions as green crimes. Of particular relevance
here is Walters’ (2010: 180) deﬁnition which “extends existing
deﬁnitions of environmental crime to include licensed or
unlawful acts of ecological degradation committed by states and
corporations.” This deﬁnition of green crime applies to POTWs
since their “licensed or unlawful” emissions at state sanctioned
facilities generates “ecological degradation” or what is also called
ecological disorganization (Schnaiberg, 1980), and contributes to
the impairment of waterway ecosystem health.
Walters’ reference to “states and corporations” suggests that
green and state/corporate crimes can intersect, an issue
speciﬁcally addressed by Moloney and Chambliss (2014).
Drawing on Mullins and Kauzlarich’s (2000) deﬁnition of state
crime and a long history of efforts to expand and problematize
the deﬁnition of crime within criminology (Moloney and
Chambliss, 2014: 326–327), Moloney and Chambliss (p. 325)
argued that social harms generated by the state should include, as
green criminologists posit, harms against non-human entities—
non-human animals, plants and ecosystems. That approach also
situates this conceptualization of green crime within a long
tradition of state crime research within criminology (for example,
Michalowski and Kramer, 2006; Rothe, 2009; Chambliss et al.,
2010; Rothe and Mullins, 2011). Building on those observations,
the present study draws attention to the types and quantity of
water pollution emitted by POTWs as representing an area of
research where the concepts of state crime and green crime
intersect one another.
Drawing on research in environmental sociology and ecological
Marxism, and situating the analysis of green crime and justice
within a political economic approach, green criminologists have
argued that green crime and injustice involve behaviours that
generate ecological disorganization—or as conditions that disrupt
and damage ecosystems and their functions (Lynch et al., 2013).
Ecological disorganization can occur in various ways. In the
present study, we focus on forms of ecological disorganization
caused by adding pollution (called ecological additions) to
ecosystems. In theory, POTWs accept waste water, treat that
water and return it to waterway ecosystems. The treated water,
however, continues to contain pollutants, and those pollutants
can disrupt the normal state of waterway ecosystems, cause
disruptions in the operation of those systems, and hence
generates ecological disorganization—what Walters’ called “eco-
logical degradation.” The extent of ecosystem disorganization in
waterways depends on the volume of pollutants that are added.
The volume of ecological additions varies across states, and across
individual waterway ecosystems used as waste-water basins, and
our analysis does not address this problem in any speciﬁc
waterway, but rather provides a general idea of the extent of this
form of ecological disorganization. From a political economic
vantage point, this form of ecological disorganization should be
expected to be widespread, but also to reﬂect the distribution of
various dimensions of the capitalist treadmill of production (ToP)
across states. Thus, in states where, for example, the ToP is
agriculturally concentrated, POTW emissions will be likely to
contain elevated levels of pollution associated with agricultural
production, while in urban areas, they will reﬂect industrial
pollution concentrations. This hypothesis concerning the rela-
tionship between POTW pollution and the capitalist ToP could
be empirically tested with disaggregated POTW data that are
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connected to census data of various types. It is not our intent to
test that hypothesis here but rather to explore the more general
observation concerning the ecological disorganizing impacts of
POTW pollution. We also illustrate that issue in part by
reviewing research on the ecological effects of the most prevalent
pollutants emitted by POTWs later in this article.
Background: POTWs
POTWs are state-owned or contracted facilities that process
waste water from a diverse array of sources including residential
areas, sewers, storm water and may sometimes include industrial
waste efﬂuent. After treatment, POTWs return processed waste-
water to waterway ecosystems. In the USA, POTWs must comply
with Clean Water Act (CWA) and National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) regulations in an effort to discharge
treated efﬂuent emissions that are environmentally safe. Techni-
cally, under US laws, industrial facilities are not supposed to emit
efﬂuents to POTWs, though US EPA allows states to side-step
this requirement by issuing “General Permits” under the NPDES
instead of under more stringent CWA requirements, and can
usually do so when industrial waste waters are pretreated (Gaba,
2007).
Though regulated by law, POTWs may nevertheless emit
polluted processed water into waterways. This occurs even when
POTWs are in compliance with their emission permits, since
those permits are not “zero” standard emission rules and allow
some level of pollution to be emitted. Despite national regulation
under the CWA and NPDES, POTW permits vary across states
and are not uniform, with states playing an important role in
determining how CWA requirements apply to POTWs within
their state (see, Lynch et al., 2014, for discussion).
Little research has addressed the quantity and types of
emissions released by POTWs, and has been more likely to
examine the technical aspects of controlling POTW emissions
(for example, Upadhyay et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2012; Vidal-
Dorsch et al., 2012). As Rahman et al., (2010) noted, while
researchers have empirically examined factors affecting other
forms of environmental compliance/noncompliance, few studies
examine POTW water pollution. Addressing that issue, Rahman
et al., (2010) examined determinants of POTW noncompliance,
generating what we can say are “expected results.” For example,
they found that larger POTWs have more noncompliance
violations while privately owned water treatment facilities have
lower rates of violation (perhaps, we would hypothesize, because
the latter usually serve smaller populations, are more likely to be
in rural areas, and process less industrial waste water). Examining
POTWs in the state of Kansas, Earnhart (2004) found that 32%
had expired permits, and that emissions sometimes exceeded
permit requirements by as much as 1453%. Earnhart also noted
that during the nine years examined, POTW emission regulations
were rarely enforced, with only 43 enforcement actions.
Examining POTW emissions and regulation enforcement is also
important because, like other pollutants, POTW emissions are
likely to be unequally distributed. Using data on water quality
from San Joaquin Valley, California, Balazs and Ray (2014)
describe the social justice implications of access to clean water,
and in particular to publicly treated drinking water. They found
that public drinking water quality and water treatment emissions
were unequally distributed across race, class and ethnic lines.
Little research has been published examining the volume and
types of emissions POTWs emit. The present study addresses
these issues by examining POTW water emissions for the most
often emitted pollutants (top pollutants) across 48 US states for
2014. These emissions, while largely legal, tell us something about
the role state facilities charged with processing waste water have
in constraining/facilitating water pollution, and serve as an
example of the complex ways in which state and green crimes
intersect and generate ecological disorganization. Before discuss-
ing these data, we provide some brief background material on the
history of water pollution laws in the USA as context.
History of US water pollution laws
Historically, interest in the problem of water pollution emerged
more than two centuries ago when the link between water
pollution, sanitation and major disease epidemics began to
emerge (http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/pollution/
02history.html). Laws related to the control of water pollution,
however, took signiﬁcantly longer to develop (Andreen, 2003).
The ﬁrst US federal law speciﬁcally designed to address water
pollution was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)
of 1948 (P.L. 80–845, 62 Stat. 1155;1 Lynch et al., 2014). At that
time, there was growing awareness that dumping raw sewage and
industrial waste into waterways was creating public health
problems and threatening waterway and wildlife health. Due to
concerns that federal regulations should not interfere with state’s
rights, FWPCA regulations applied to interstate waterways, but
only offered encouragement to improve waterway quality by
limiting pollution without the use of any speciﬁc pollution limits
or penalties (the law allowed only for abatement actions; Barry,
1970).
The next major step in controlling water pollution in the USA
was the CWA of 1972, which followed the creation of the US EPA
in 1970. Technically, the CWA amended the FWPCA (Lynch
et al., 2014). The CWA established the ﬁrst rules for regulating
water pollution discharges, and gave the US EPA authority to
establish wastewater standards for industries, and for all waste-
water receiving waterways in the USA. The CWA required that all
“persons” who discharged pollutants into waterways obtain a
pollution permit. The permit system allowed EPA to track
pollutants to their sources, and monitor the volume of waterway
pollution being discharged, and in doing so to obtain a better
understanding of the kinds and quantities of pollutants being
emitted into waterways. This information could then be used to
limit/regulate waterway emissions to improve water quality and
decrease the public health/ecosystem impacts of waterway
pollution discharges—or in our terminology, to decrease the
ecological disorganization effects of water pollution emissions.
These efforts were related to the policy objectives of the CWA,
which was to make all US waterways “ﬁshable and swimmable”
by 1985, an objective that has yet to be attained 32 years later.
Indeed, according to US EPA’s assessment (https://ofmpub.epa.
gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control), 55.5% of streams and
rivers, 70.3% of reservoirs and ponds, 78.3% of bays and estuaries,
88.9% of coastal shorelines, and 53.4% of wetlands are currently
impaired and, as a result, fail to meet CWA criteria.
POTWs are primarily regulated under CWA Titles II and VI
(33 U.S.C. § 1281, 33 U.S.C. § 1381). To facilitate wastewater
treatment, the EPA provides grant assistance to construct
POTWs. Industry is normally expected to maintain separate
wastewater treatment systems. However, industrial users (IUs)
and signiﬁcant industrial users may emit wastewater to POTWs
when that water has been pretreated and meets standards
speciﬁed in the National Pretreatment Program (40 CFR 403).
IUs are prohibited from discharging certain pollutants to POTWs
(40 CFR 403.5) unless the POTW has installed equipment for
processing excepted IU water emissions.
The EPA also established secondary standards for POTW
emissions under NPDES. Secondary treatment standards include
the use of technology-based biological treatment of wastewater
and apply to all POTWs. These standards are assessed through
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the use of chemical measurement of POTW emissions (that is,
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), carbonaceous biochemical
oxygen demand (CBOD and CBOD5) and total suspended solid
(TSS) measures), measures we used below in our analysis.
States receive a permit to operate POTWs from the EPA. Each
state’s permit must respond to the speciﬁc water pollution
problems within that state and address water treatment solutions
appropriate to that state, unless an exception is granted. As a
result, there are no general, national statutory standards
concerning POTW emissions.
Perhaps due to the complexity of POTW regulations and
variability in those regulations across states, no prior study has
examined national emissions by POTWs. Instead, studies have
examined individual POTW’s environmental effects, POTWs in a
single state (Earnhart, 2004; Maruya et al., 2012, 2014; Daigger
et al., 2014), the effect of POTW emissions on speciﬁc species
(Vidal-Dorsch et al., 2013a, b), and the processing of speciﬁc
pollutants at POTWs (for example, Flippin et al., 2014;
Balasubramani and Rifai, 2015). In the present study, we examine
national or aggregated US POTW emissions to address the
general impact of POTWs on US waterways and how those
emissions by state facilities contribute to ecological disorganiza-
tion/green crimes against ecosystems and constitute green-state
crimes.
Data. For the current study, data on water pollution emissions by
POTWs by state were collected from the US EPA DMR pollutant
loading tool (PLT; http://cfpub.epa.gov/dmr/ez_search.cfm). The
PLT produces data on a state by state basis, which were then
aggregated for the year 2014. Not all states were included in the
2014 PLT data for POTWs, and due to missing data, we were only
able to collect data for 48 states.2 These data were supplemented
with indicators from the US Department of Agriculture to create
standardized pollution measurements. The US EPA estimates that
the nation’s POTWs treat and release 32 billion gallons of
wastewater each day.
The data used in this study quantify emissions, not violations
of law, and because they quantify emissions, are indicators of the
concept of green crime as ecological disorganization. As noted
earlier, green crimes often expand beyond the scope of law, and
even legally allowable behaviours can create ecosystem, human
and non-human animal harms that can be deﬁned as green
crimes. In the current case, we suggest that evidence of those
green crimes is reﬂected by both the quantity of POTW emissions
and the harms associated with POTW emissions. Information on
the harms associated with POTW emissions are summarized later
in this article.
Although POTWs emit numerous pollutants, the majority of
those emissions involve forty-four pollutants commonly emitted
by POTWs. We identiﬁed those forty-four pollutants by
recording the top ten pollutants in pounds emitted by POTWs
in each state. Our data describes two measures of POTW
pollutants: (1) the pounds of the top ten emitted pollutants within
each state in pounds; and (2) pounds of the top three toxic
pollutants in each state in toxic-weighted pound equivalents
(TWPE). These data are, following applicable regulations, self-
reported by POTWs. We focused attention on the top ten
pollutants in each state because we estimated from these data that
those pollutants accounted for more than 99% of all POTW
emissions in pounds. We used the TWPE data to illustrate the
kinds of dangerous pollutants POTWs emit. Both measures are
indicators of different dimension of ecological disorganization.
Data on the distribution of POWTs across states along with
measures of POTW types are shown in Table 1. There were
15,562 POTWs for the 48 states in the sample, with a mean of
324.2 POTWs per state ranging from N= 2 (Hawaii) to N= 1261
(Texas). Twenty states had POTWs in excess of the mean.
Results
Aggregate emissions. The current study measured aggregate
POTW emissions for the top ten pollutants emitted by each state
(in total, 44 chemicals), and thus this estimate is not an estimate
of the total pollution POTWs emit. The pounds of pollutants
emitted by POTW using our measure was more than 197.48
billion pounds—which we estimate was 499% of all POTW
emissions in 2014.
Across states, POTWs emitted between 8.8 million to 185.2
billion pounds of pollutants during 2014. The mean pounds
emitted were 4.114 billion. Nine states’ POTWs emitted
pollutants in excess of the mean, and the mean was signiﬁcantly
skewed by Minnesota’s POTW emissions (more than 185 billion
pounds)—about 46 times the mean. The vast majority (99.6%) of
Minnesota POTW emissions were total dissolved solids (TDSs).3
(See Supplementary Appendix A for pounds of top ten pollutants
emitted by each state, and an indicator of pounds per acre of state
land). The majority of pollutants emitted by POTWs across states
involved two pollutants: TDSs and TSSs.
Emission requirements. Under the NPDES (40 CFR 122.44 (a)
(1)), states must report discharges from POTWs to the EPA. In
turn, states typically obtain those data from POTW self-
monitored emissions. Given local water quality issues, few
POTWs (N= 213; 1.4%) are required to continuously monitor
water emissions by EPA. As Table 1 indicates, however, the
majority (77.1%) of POTWs have efﬂuent limits. This data sug-
gests that US EPA, though charged with monitoring and assessing
US water quality, rarely requires individual POTWs to con-
tinuously monitor their emissions, even though, as noted earlier,
a signiﬁcant portion of US waterways fail to meet CWA
requirements that were supposed to be met by 1985. In this case,
it seems, EPA is not regulating POTW emission as stringently as
it might to in an effort to meet CWA imposed water quality
standards.
Top pollutants. Table 2 displays the distribution of the top ten
pollutants across all 48 states, and displays a count of the number
of times a pollutant is recorded as the top pollutant in each state
(N= 48). States were most likely to list TDSs as their top pollu-
tant, followed by TSS, and 31 states (64.6%) listed one of these
two pollutants as their top pollutant. Three pollution categories
Table 1 | Distribution of POTWs across states
POTWs Major POTWs N monitored N with efﬂuent limits
Number 15,562 4334 (27.8%) 213 (1.4%) 11,998 (77.1%)
Mean/state 324.2 90.29 4.4 250.0
Minimum/state 2 2 0 2
Maximum/state 1261 451 148 1191
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(nitrogen, ammonia and Kjeldahl nitrogen pollution) measured
some dimension of nitrogen pollution, a serious water pollution
concern because excessive nitrogen can cause eutrophication—a
lack of water oxygen content that can lead to the death of aquatic
species. Six states (12.5%) listed nitrogen related pollutant as their
top pollutant. In addition, three states listed BOD, another
indicator of water oxygen content, as a top pollutant. BOD
measures organic water pollution and water quality. A related
measure, Carbonaceous BOD (CBOD; also an oxygen demand
indicator) was reported as the top pollutant in one state. Oxygen
demand related measures (nitrogen/BOD/CBOD) are important
dimensions of water pollution and quality. In sum, 41 states listed
the above six pollutants as their top pollutant.
Aggregation, top ten pollutants. Across states, the aggregation of
the top pollutants from each state yielded a total of 44 different
pollutants. Table 3 shows only the most frequent of these pol-
lutants, and the number of states reporting those pollutants as
being among their top ten pollutants. Table 3 can be interpreted
as displaying the number of states out of 48 that listed each
pollutant among its top ten pollutants. With respect to the pre-
vious discussion of eutrophication, 43 and 42 states, respectively,
listed CBOD and BOD among their top ten pollutants—indica-
tors that in most states, POTW emissions may be seriously
impacting waterway oxygen content, and generating potentially
serious waterway ecological disorganization such as the potential
for eutrophication. Additionally, a number of states report
ammonia (N= 42), phosphorus (N= 37), nitrogen (N= 30) and
inorganic nitrogen (N= 28) as top ten pollutants. These pollu-
tants can disorganize waterway ecosystems by promoting exces-
sive plant growth. It should also be noted that across the top ten
pollutants, states report emitting in excess of 2 billion pounds of
monitored efﬂuent emissions into the nation’s waterways.
Toxic-weighted pound equivalents. The PLT tool also contains
data on TWPE. The TWPE is calculated using the toxic weighting
factor (TWF) for pollutants that are known to be toxicants,
therefore not all POTW emissions have a TWF. In the present
study, we recorded the top three TWPEs for POTW efﬂuents in
states, and then aggregated those data to create Table 3. The
TWPE can be viewed as a measure of the most toxic chemicals
emitted by POTWs.
Twenty-seven different chemicals with toxic properties were
identiﬁed as being emitted by POTWs using this indicator.
Because we limited this assessment to the top three TWPE
chemicals in each state, the data in Table 3 present only a limited
picture of highly toxic pollution emissions by POTWs. In cases
where the quantities of TWPEs emitted appear quite small, one
must remember that these are highly toxic chemicals that, despite
their small quantity, could have serious adverse impacts on local
waterway aquatic species (especially for sensitive species). The
most widely released toxin in this group was residual chlorine,
which was long ago identiﬁed as having adverse health
consequences for aquatic species (Brungs, 1973; Bellanca and
Bailey, 1977; Helz and Nweke, 1995). In addition, residual
chlorine may also pose health risks to humans at elevated
concentrations (Mills et al., 1998). The second most prevalent
toxin in this group was copper, which also has adverse impacts on
aquatic species and, because of its toxic properties, is also used as
an ingredient in some insecticides/pesticides/fungicides (Brix
et al., 2001) (See Table 4).
Pollution concentrations. POTW emissions data can also be
used to assess various pollution concentrations across states. As
noted above, Minnesota emitted the largest quantity of total top
ten pollutants (185 billion pounds). Those emissions were 63.8
times larger than POTW emission reported by the state second
on the list, Ohio (2.9 billion pounds), and 75.9 times larger than
the third highest POTW pollution emitter, California (2.446
billion pounds). There is a signiﬁcant decline in the pounds of top
ten pollutants reported by POTWs in the next grouping (state
Table 2 | Top pollutants across 48 states
Classiﬁcation No. of
states
Classiﬁcation No. of
states
Dissolved solids (TDS) 18 Carbonaceous BOD 1
Suspended solids
(TSS)
13 COD 1
Chloride 4 Oxygen demand 1
Nitrogen 3 Sulfate 1
BOD 3 Kjeldahl nitrogen 1
Ammonia 2
Table 3 | Most frequently discovered pollutants in POTW
emissions across top 10 pollutants and states
Total suspended solids 48
Carbonaceous BOD 43
Ammonia 42
BOD 42
Phosphorus 37
Nitrogen 30
Total dissolved solids 29
Inorganic nitrogen 28
Residual chlorine 19
Table 4 | Ranking of top three toxic-weighted pound
equivalent emissions across states (alphabetic listing)
Chemical 1st 2nd 3rd Total
1,2,3,6,7,8-Hexachlorodibenzofuran 0 1 0 1
2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-benzene 1 0 0 1
Aluminum 0 1 0 1
Ammonia as N 1 8 10 19
Arsenic 2 1 2 5
Benzidine 0 1 1 2
Cadmium 3 2 3 8
Chlordane 0 0 1 1
Copper 5 11 8 24
Cyanide 0 1 2 3
Deldrine 2 0 0 2
Dissolved nitrate 1 0 0 1
Floride 0 1 0 1
Iron 0 0 1 1
Lead 0 3 3 6
Magnesium 0 1 0 1
Mercury 2 4 4 10
NH3 0 1 0 1
Nickel 0 0 1 1
p, p'-DDT 0 1 0 1
PCBs 2 1 2 5
Residual chlorine 28 1 6 35
Selenium 1 1 0 2
Silver 0 1 1 2
Sulﬁde 0 1 0 1
Toxophene 0 1 0 1
Zinc 0 4 2 6
Abbreviations: DDT, dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane; PCB, polychlorinated biphenyl.
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reporting between 501 to 578.2 million pounds of emission:
Arizona, New York, Nevada, West Virginia, Pennsylvania and
Indiana). At the opposite end of the spectrum, the lowest level of
POTW emissions were reported in Maine, which released “only”
about 8.8 million pounds of top ten pollutants, followed by New
Hampshire (10.49 million pounds), and South Dakota (10.8
million pounds). Future research can explore whether levels of
emission by POTWs across states is related to the distribution or
composition of the ToP (see, Stretesky et al., 2013).
Standardized emission measures. In the aggregate the top ten
pollutants represent a signiﬁcantly large quantity of waterway
pollution and ecological disorganization potential. Other mea-
sures of those pollutants are useful to contextual those emissions.
One approach is to standardized POTW pollution emission per
miles of rivers and stream per state, or as pounds of pollution per
state area (in acres). Water-based POTW emissions are difﬁcult
to quantify given that in addition to rivers and streams, they may
also be emitted to lakes and ponds, and in some states, oceans and
estuaries. Some of those water bodies are measured in miles, and
others in acres, requiring signiﬁcant effort to convert those data
to make them comparable. A simpler standardization employs
pounds of POTW pollutants per state acre, which may not be the
most useful standardization for POTW pollution since, after all,
those emissions occur in waterways. Pounds of POTW emissions
per acre data for each state are found in Supplementary Appendix
A. In Supplementary Appendix A, the highest concentrations of
POTW emissions are found in Minnesota (2.13 million pounds
per acre), Ohio (64,837), West Virginia (22,431), New Jersey
(19,858) and California (14,943). Here, as with the total pounds of
emission, Minnesota leads the way and emissions fall signiﬁcantly
for state’s outside of Minnesota. Following standardization, the
order of the remaining top polluters change. States generating the
least POTW waste per acre include: Alaska (37.15), New Mexico
(102.88), Wyoming (129.25), South Dakota (140.17) and Maine
(248.78). Here too, standardization alters the list of smallest
pollution levels by state when compared with total pounds of
emissions. Criminologists should be quite familiar with standar-
dization and its uses in relation to, for example, measuring crime
or incarceration rates. In the latter cases, the total number of
crimes is less preferable to measuring crime per 100,000 popu-
lation, though something can be learned from examining both
types of measures.4
Water quality assessment. The data above tell us something
about the general problem of POTW pollution in the USA. It is
also important to consider the possible human (public health)
and ecological effects of those pollutants. Here, we review that
issue in brief as another example of how POTW emissions con-
stitute green-state crimes that cause ecological disorganization
effects. For this portion of the analysis, we limited the discussion
to a review of prior research on pollutants POTWs emit that were
most often identiﬁed in the empirical portion of our analysis.
Total dissolved solids. TDSs are chemicals and ions that pass through
ﬁlters with pores of approximately 2 microns, and include
calcium, carbonate and bicarbonate, chlorides, iron, magnesium,
nitrate, phosphorus, sodium, sulphur and other ions/particles
such as salts, organic matter and minerals (Weber-Scannell and
Duffy, 2007). TDS emissions can produce toxicity in three ways:
by increasing water salinity; by altering the ion composition of
water; and by affecting the toxicity of individual ions (Weber-
Scannell and Duffy, 2007). These effects occur because the level of
dissolved solids in water affects the rate of ﬂow of water into and
out of an organism’s cells, affecting the balance of chemicals and
ions at the cellular level. Extant research indicates that elevated
levels of dissolved solids in waterways can: retard the growth or
cause the death of aquatic species; cause a decrease in waterway
species diversity as water salinity increases; degrade water clarity
and hence cause a decline in plant photosynthesis; promote
chemical reactions between toxins and dissolved solids; cause
dehydration, and in extreme cases death in species through the
laxative effects of exposure to water with high TDS concentra-
tions (Weber-Scannell and Duffy, 2007).
Total suspended solids. TSSs are small particles that do not settle
when water is left standing and can pass through a ﬁlter with
pores of 0.45 microns. TSS do not ordinarily present direct health
problems, but interfere with efforts to disinfect water, and can
provide a medium for the growth of microbes/bacteria. TSS have
also been associated with a decline in ﬁshery resources and
extensive “degradation of aquatic environments” (Bilotta and
Brazier, 2008); to interfere with water clarity, which decreases
photosynthesis, causing a decline in water-biomass and con-
tributing to eutrophication (US EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/
rsl/monitoring/vms58.cfm); and to declining species biodiversity
among species less tolerant to elevated TSS levels (Kemp et al.,
2011).
Carbonaceous biological oxygen demand (CBOD). CBOD measures the
ability of waste waters to reduce or deplete the oxygen content of
receiving waters. Water emissions with high organic content
increase the use of oxygen for oxidation, potentially decreasing
species richness and causing eutrophication (Ganoulis, 2009).
Biological oxygen demand (BOD). BOD measures the amount of
dissolved oxygen needed by microbial organisms for the
metabolism of organic compounds in water (Sharma, 2009:431).
As BOD increases, available oxygen declines. This outcome can
limit the growth of some aquatic species; increase the growth of
harmful water-based bacteria; decrease the presence of microbes
in the aquatic food-chain reducing species diversity and
concentrations; promote poor water quality; and cause eutrophi-
cation (Sharma, 2009; US EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/rsl/
monitoring/vms52.cfm). These pollutants often enter POTWs
through urban sewer systems and via farm run-off rich in
fertilizers and organic matter (for example, leaves, lawn cuttings).
Ammonia. According to the US EPA (2013), “Ammonia is … one
of the most important pollutants in the aquatic environment not
only because of its highly toxic nature, but also its ubiquity in
surface water systems.” The primary source of ammonia in
wastewater is from agricultural and industrial production.
Ammonia can be toxic to aquatic life forms. Elevated levels of
ammonia are known to have adverse consequences on a variety of
species of ﬁsh, snails, amphibians, mollusks and invertebrates (for
example, Mayes et al., 1986; Clearwater et al., 2014).
Phosphorus. Agricultural and urban run-off are major contributors
to waterway phosphorus pollution. Phosphorus pollution has a
signiﬁcant role in waterway eutrophication through excessive
production of algae (Correll, 1998; Bennet et al., 2001) and may
appear abruptly once an absorption level is surpassed (Bennet
et al., 2001). Much freshwater ecosystem phosphorus content
results from excessive phosphorus inputs into ecosystems
through fertilizer run-off and animal feed operations (Bennet
et al., 2001), which can cause phosphorus run-off into waters
processed by POTWs.
Nitrogen. Nitrogen pollution presents ecological problems similar
to those associated with phosphorus pollution including excessive
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water nutrients, algae growth, and eutrophication, as well as
waterway acidiﬁcation, and a decline in acid-sensitive species
(Driscoll et al., 2003). Agricultural run-off and the widespread use
of fertilizers on lawns, public parks/spaces, and golf courses are
signiﬁcant non-point sources of water-based nitrogen pollution
(Carpenter et al., 1998), and Driscoll et al., (2003) estimate that
anthropogenic nitrogen pollution has doubled the volume of
reactive nitrogen in ecosystems.
Discussion
The data and environmental health concerns reviewed above
indicated that across US states, POTWs release signiﬁcant
quantities of pollutants into waterways potentially causing
extensive ecological disorganization, a green crime (Lynch et al.,
2013). POTWs do not generate the majority of those pollutants
with the exception of pollution residuals related to water
treatment methods. For example, in a study of mercury pollution
in New York City’s harbour, Cerreno et al., (2002) note that
POTWs emit signiﬁcant quantities of mercury pollution into the
harbour. That pollution, however, does not originate in POTWs
(POTWs can contribute to chemical interactions that convert
inorganic mercury into more reactive methylmercury). Rather,
the emitted mercury pollution is received by POTWs from
numerous sources including dental facilities, hospitals, labora-
tories, and households; although the greatest source of mercury
contamination of the harbour is landﬁll run-off. Nevertheless, the
fact that POTWs are routes for environmental pollution raises a
question about the responsibilities of the state with respect to its
environmental (ecosystem and wildlife) and public health
protection responsibilities. This pollution pathway through
POTWs is also, we would suggest, part of the political economic
organization of capitalism and the ToP.
Individual states take the responsibility to protect public and
ecological health more or less seriously than others. As Sigman
(2002) noted, while many environmental regulations are federal
in origin, responsibility for monitoring and enforcing POTW
regulations often falls to states because in the USA, states can
request authorization to monitor and enforce POTW regulations.
Although state POTW permits are approved by the US EPA,
Sigman states that there is substantial discretion involved in
preparing and approving CWA permits and EPA does not apply a
single, uniform standard for water pollution emissions across all
states. Indeed, while federal guidelines impose minimum
pollution standards, EPA can modify those requirements
depending on existing water quality concerns within a state and
after determining whether POTW discharges impact already
“impaired waterways.” As Sigman noted “(p)ermits are subject to
negotiation between polluter and regulator and to public
comment periods … .” Using data for NPDES permits for ﬁve
pollutants (cadmium, copper, lead, mercury and zinc), Sigman
found considerable variability in EPA-imposed water discharge
limits. For cadmium, the least stringent state requirement was
four times lower than the most stringent state requirement; for
copper, 38 times lower; for lead 312 times lower; for mercury, 750
times lower; and for zinc, 60 times lower. With respect to the
issue of state responsibility for protecting the ecosystem and
public health, we can see from POTW emissions data that some
states take more and some states much less responsibility for
maintaining healthy environments through POTW emissions.
In his analysis of CWA permits, Sigman argued that states have
different rationale for implementing state monitored/enforced
water pollution control programs. States may be seeking to
stream-line regulations, or may seek to implement more or less
stringent regulations to attract or repel certain types of industries.
Here, one could argue that states make a trade-off between
economic development and environmental protection. This
scenario is possible across states precisely because the US
EPA authorizes different permit standards across states. Under
these conditions, some states are willing to impose lesser
environmental protection requirements to attract industry at
the cost of increased environmental pollution that potentially
reduces ecosystem and public health.
One solution to this problem would be for the US EPA to apply
more consistent or uniform pollution standards. However,
Sigman suggests that this is unlikely since once a state’s system
is approved by EPA, it is nearly impossible for EPA to revoke the
state’s permit. Sigman uses the example of Arkansas to illustrate
this point: “Arkansas refuses to impose federal discharge limits
and monitoring requirements for municipal water pollution
sources because they are ‘‘too strict’’ and would subject the state
to litigation. The regional EPA ofﬁce says its ‘‘only recourse
would be to take back responsibility for the program—an
unrealistic option’’ …. Thus, once authorized, states have quite
a free hand to conduct (or ignore) the program.”
From a technological/scientiﬁc perspective, it is highly unlikely
that POTWs can prevent the emission of all pollutants into
waterways and that some level of POTW pollution is, therefore,
inevitable. Despite that inevitability, states could still engage in
“best efforts” to provide the most efﬁcient treatment of waste-
waters before they are emitted into ecosystems. Why do states/
governments fail to promote enhanced water treatment at
POTWs, thereby contributing to water pollution? There are
three possible explanations.
First, in neo-liberal societies—those with a capitalist political
economic system—citizens prefer minimal regulation, whether
they are individuals, corporation or other private business
entities, and research on this issue suggests that income and
environmental concern are inversely related (Earnhart, 2004; Lo,
2014). Responding to public desires, states maintain minimal
environmental regulations necessary for the protection of some
unspeciﬁed level of ecosystem and public health (Earnhart, 2004).
How a state makes a determination concerning adequate
wastewater treatment is open to debate. However, in a neo-
liberal regulatory environment, regulated entities are regularly
invited to comment on proposed environmental regulations,
perhaps creating a state preference for crafting environmental
regulations around that portion of the “community’s” views on
environmental matters (Coffey and Marston, 2013). Because the
views of citizens are not monolithic and vary from state to state,
citizens (including corporations) in some states have a preference
for greater environmental protection than citizens in other states
leading to differentials in cross-state environmental regulations,
and in the case of the current study, is perhaps evident in the
quantity of environmental pollutants emitted by POTWs across
states. Thus, in its regulatory role and in its role as protector of
citizens and ecosystems, the state acquires the duty to protect
ecosystems and public health as well as corporate interests, and
“chooses” (in neoliberal theory) or is “forced” (an idea consistent
with structural analysis) to do so in different ways within the
governance context of any given state (for example, see various
chapters in Braithwaite and Levi, 1998).
The above view also represents a generic “democratic” theory
of governance, and paints a picture of environmental regulation
as a compromise between competing interests and values with the
state as arbitrator. That view fails to ask whether in striking such
a compromise, the state has met its duties to sufﬁciently protect
ecosystem and public health. The problem with asking this
question is that one must have some rationale or measurement
for assessing whether or not the state’s regulatory behaviour (or
in this case, its polluting behaviour) is sufﬁcient to protect
ecological and public health. With respect to the speciﬁc issue of
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pollution, such rationales are easily mustered from scientiﬁc
studies, which can and have been used to determine the level at
which exposure to pollution and the accumulation of pollution
become ecosystem and public health problems, as previous green
criminological studies illustrate (see examples in Lynch and
Stretesky, 2014). In asking (and answering) this type of question
concerning the efﬁcacy of state pollution control practices, two
additional positions concerning the assessment of POTW
pollution emissions, which we suggest relate to numerous
arguments green criminologists have made about deﬁning the
parameters of green crime, harm and justice (Lynch and
Stretesky, 2003; Walters, 2006, 2007; Brisman, 2008; Lynch
et al., 2013; Ruggiero and South, 2013a, b; White, 2013; Sollund,
2015; White and Kramer, 2015) emerge. The ﬁrst of these
questions addresses whether pollution emissions from POTWs
can be conceptualized as green crimes/harms. The second
involves questions about whether state emissions from POTWs
are a form of ecological injustice, and whether such emissions are
unequally disbursed and have unequal adverse consequences for
citizens related to the racial, ethnic and class composition of
neighborhoods and communities near POTW pollution receiving
waterways.
With respect to crime, Ruggiero and South’s (2013a, b) analysis
of the intersection of toxic state-corporate crimes contains one
mechanism for understanding the polluting behaviour of state-
owned POTWs as a green crime. Ruggerio and South assert that
“in general, hegemonic discourses around ‘‘growth and freedom’’
have, during the last few decades, intensiﬁed the potential
destructiveness of enterprise,” and when coupled with neo-liberal
economic and governance polices have contributed to the state’s
tendency to treat pollution as “accidental, unintentional and
external” (p. 12). In our view, this assertion implies that the neo-
liberal/capitalist state has a role in facilitating ecological
disorganization. For Ruggerio and South, in this neo-liberal
political economic context the state cannot establish environ-
mental rules that prevent economic expansion (which is also a
requirement included in many US environmental regulations, see,
Lynch, Burns and Stretesky, 2014 for examples). Ruggerio and
South apply this argument to an analysis of state-corporate green
crimes in the oil, asbestos and chemical industries to illustrate
how states facilitate green corporate crimes. Unfortunately in the
examination of state-owned POTWs, such an analysis, while
appealing due to its state-corporate-green crime link, does not
appear to readily apply to POTW pollution since POTW
emissions have, at ﬁrst glance, little connection to, for example,
preserving economic expansion. However, as we noted earlier,
POTW regulations are state-based and the speciﬁc regulations
that apply to POTWs vary across states. States can, as Sigman
argued, promote weak CWA regulations with the intention of
promoting economic growth. Empirical studies by green
criminologists also suggest that environmental regulations are
ineffective in controlling environmental violations and pollution,
and that in particular, in the political economic context of
capitalism, environmental regulations are ineffective mechanism
for constraining the growth of the ToP or ToP generated
ecological disorganization (Long et al., 2012; Stretesky et al.,
2013). Better understanding these issues requires further
examinations of the emissions of pollutants by POTWs.
Equally important is the observation that states, because they
are repositories of collective public responsibilities, have a duty to
protect ecosystem and public health, and it can be argued,
therefore, that the failure to do so contains the seeds of green-
state crime. In this case, the green crimes of the state related to
POTW emissions involves promoting weaker water pollution and
treatment standards than those derived scientiﬁcally, which
would better protect ecosystem and public health. The EPA
provides states with incentives to build and modify water
treatment facilities through the State Revolving Fund (SRF)
program. Whether or not states use those funds to build state of
the art or minimally necessary water treatment facilities is an
open question. The EPA provides guidance to states for the
planning/designing of water treatment facilities (http://www3.epa.
gov/npdes/pubs/ primer.pdf), but we were unable to locate
information addressing whether states adopt any speciﬁc EPA
recommendations. In addition, whether EPA recommendations
for wastewater treatment represent the most recent technology
and best available practice is also an open question. Recent
studies suggest, for example, the use of absorption technology for
water pollution treatment (Ali and Gupta, 2007), a technology
which is not mentioned in EPA’s guidance documents.
A second green criminological approach to assessing POTW
water pollution emissions is to investigate whether such emissions
constitute forms of ecological and/or environmental (in)justice.
As White (2007) suggests, ecological justice focuses on issues
related to environmental conservation including animal rights
and biosphere conservation, while environmental justice involves
an assessment of social justice in relation to exposure patterns to
environmental hazards created by humans—issues that have been
addressed empirically by green criminologists (Stretesky and
Lynch, 1999, 2002, 2011; Lynch et al., 2004; Lynch and Stretesky,
2013). As the data reviewed above indicated, POTW emissions
varied widely across states. To be sure, much of that variability
has to do with the content of the waste stream received by
POTWs, which varies across states and is dependent, we
hypothesize, on the structure of the ToP across states. But, state
POTW regulations also affect the content of the waste stream
allowing, for example, industrial emissions to POTWs in some
states while other states exclude those emissions and require
separate industrial facility processing of waste waters. Regardless,
the question that remains is whether the distribution of POTW
emissions is also a function of the type of wastewater/sewage
treatment a state selects. Our data cannot directly address that
question. However, it is clear from the distribution of POTW
pollution across states that some states may indeed provide better
methods for processing waste waters, enhancing both ecological
and environmental justice. Unfortunately, answering this ques-
tion involves undertaking extensive and perhaps complex future
empirical research. The issue of POTWs and environmental
justice has rarely been mentioned in prior studies (Toeffel and
Marshall, 2004; Wilson et al., 2008).
There is much future research that can be undertaken to
further explore how state POTW emissions, green crime and
environmental justice issues intersect, and how those issues
require attention to the concept of green-state crime. As one
example, the US EPA Pollution Discharge Monitoring Report
Pollution Loading Tool can be used to extract data concerning the
quantity of CWA Priority Pollutants, Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
hazardous substances emissions, toxic release inventory (TRI)
emissions, and radionuclide pollution emitted by POTWs. As a
brief example, we employed the PLT to generate a list of CWA
Priority pollutants emitted by POTWs in Alabama. The resulting
list of top POTW generators of CWA Priority Pollutants in
Alabama provide several indicators concerning the average and
maximum concentrations and total pounds of CWA Priority
pollutant at each facility. Data on total pounds for individual
POTW Priority Pollutants can also be collected from the PLT. In
the Alabama example, we selected data for the Slab Creek
Wastewater Treatment Plant in Boaz. That data indicated that
Slab Creek emits three CWA Priority Pollutants: copper, mercury
and zinc. While the Slab Creek facility has a maximum allowable
annual emission for copper of zero pounds, the facility emitted
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.70
8 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17070 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.70 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
56.2 pounds of copper. Monthly reports for Slab Creek’s copper
emissions indicate the facility violated its permit concerning
copper emissions.5 These data can be used for assessing
POTW compliance with permitted emissions, an issue that has
yet to be explored to our knowledge using these data. Use of data
of this type is, in our view, extremely important to the further
development of green criminology and for efforts to extend the
penetration of green criminological research into the
criminological mainstream given the long standing focus on
quantitative data in mainstream criminology (see Lynch et al.,
2017 for discussion).
Conclusion
This study examined POTW emissions as an example of green
crime, illustrating the extent of this problem in the USA, and
posed that this behaviour is a green-state crime that generates
various types of ecological disorganization. Consistent with our
argument, Moloney and Chambliss (2014: 320) argued that
“encouraging green criminologists and state crime scholars to
combine their resources and perspectives when analysing and
explaining certain environmental harms stemming from state
actions or inactions is not only timely, but beneﬁcial in a
substantive sense for each discipline, and in a practical sense for
the societies we are embedded within.”
Our study indicated that POTWs emitted large quantities of
pollutants—nearly 200 billion pounds—to US waterways during
2014. The quantity of pollutants emitted varied widely across
states, and as noted, POTW themselves do not generate the
majority of those pollutants (except for those related to the
treatment of waste waters), but receive those pollutants from
various emission sources. Nevertheless, this raises a question
about the stringency of wastewater treatment regulations within
each state as guided by federal regulations, and whether states
employ sufﬁcient water treatment processes for the protection of
ecological and public health. Equally important, we suggested that
these emissions can be viewed as part of the intersection of green
and state crimes, and that future studies should investigate
environmental justice questions related to POTW emissions.
Thus, our analysis has relevance to both the state crime and green
crime literatures.
As Moloney and Chambliss noted, little attention has been paid
to the intersection of green and state crimes. Their observation
opens a potentially wide-range of behaviours to examination by
both green criminologists and state crime researchers. Recent
examples of the expansion of this type of research include
criminological studies of climate change that illustrate how the
state contributes or becomes involved in green crimes (Lynch
et al., 2010; Bradshaw, 2015; White and Kramer, 2015; and
various chapters in White, 2012).
Finally, while green criminologists have often cited water
pollution as a general example of a green crime, few green
criminological studies actually address the scope of water
pollution crimes and the forms of injustice such crime pose,
particularly through the use of quantitative data. Much future
research remains to be done on this topic, and those efforts can
draw on a wide range of scientiﬁc studies and evidence that has
already been complied.
Notes
1 The US River and Harbors Act (RHA) of 1899, the oldest US environmental law, is
often mentioned as a water pollution control Act. The Refuse Act section of RHA
made it a misdemeanor to dump refuse into navigable waterways to prohibit dumping
waste that prevented navigation of waterways, rather than to prevent pollution to
protect ecological or public health (see US EPA’s, “Explanatory Statement:
Implementation of the ‘National Pollution Discharge Elimination System’ Pursuant to
Section 402, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.”).
2 Data were missing for New Jersey for 2014, and instead the most recent data for New
Jersey (2012) was used. Data were also missing for Vermont. There is no substitute
data available for Vermont because it does not use the federal Permit Compliance
System to report POTW emissions. Data for Kansas only represented POTWs on
Indian Lands, and thus were omitted.
3 Suspecting that the total dissolved solids may involve a reporting error or perhaps new
reporting requirements in Minnesota, we examined data from prior years. In 2013,
Minnesota POTWs reported emitting more than 96.57 billion pounds of total dis-
solved solids, about one-half of the total reported in 2014. In 2012, those facilities
reported emitting only 1.1 billion pounds of total dissolved solids; in 2011, Minnesota
POTWs reported emitting only 297.2 million pounds of total dissolved solids. One
potential reason for this increased reported of total dissolved solids in Minnesota was a
change in monitoring and reporting requirements (see, http://www.pca.state.mn.us/
index.php/view-document.html?gid= 6267).
4 We attempted to standardize POTW pollution relative to miles of rivers and stream
within each states. As noted, this measure omits important dimensions of those
emissions in some states such as coastal states, which may emit to estuaries and
oceans, and Great Lake states or other states where signiﬁcant emissions are made to
large water bodies. Again, miles of rivers and streams and emissions to acres of lakes
and estuaries are difﬁcult to convert and compare. Nevertheless, we did perform
calculations for pounds per mile of rivers and streams, and present only a few
examples for the top and smallest polluters. Top POTW polluters include per miles of
rivers and streams include: Minnesota (2 million pounds per mile), Ohio (99,830),
New Jersey (26,855), West Virginia (16,838) and Massachusetts (15,057); while the
lowest levels are found in: Alaska (67.7 pds/mile), New Mexico (112.96), Wyoming
(116.24), Maine (227.16), and Mississippi (375.44). Future research should consider
addressing additional aspects of water POTW emission to lakes, estuaries and
oceans state-green crime. Such studies might also employ exact POTW locations and
GIS software to assess the effects of POTW pollution on concentrations of human
populations and the racial, ethnic and class composition of affect populations,
speciﬁc waterways, sensitive ecosystem locations, in relation to sensitive wildlife
habitat, ﬁsh breeding grounds, or in relationship to the distribution of endangered
species.
5 In addition, we assessed the CWA Priority Pollutant emissions at the remaining nine
Alabama POTWs. The results were as follows: Roanoke, no exceedances; Helena, no
exceedances; Chase Area, four exceedances out of four measures for mercury;
Orange Beach, no exceedances; Geneva, three exceedances; Phenix, no exceedance;
Wright Smith, three exceedances for copper; Cullman, no exceedances; Huntsville
Big Cove, four exceedances out of four test for mercury to be determined by further
assessment.
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